[Draft: June 20, 2006-Please do not cite reproduce or distribute without permission]

An Essay on Vengeance and Forgiveness
Theodore Y. Blumoff#
Who sees not that vengeance, from the force alone of passion, may be so
eagerly pursued, as to make us knowingly neglect every consideration of ease,
interest, or safety; and, like some vindictive animals, infuse our very souls
into the wounds of the enemy; and what malignant philosophy must it be,
that will not allow to humanity and friendship the same privileges which are
indisputably granted to the darker passions of enmity and resentment?*
Magnanimity, or a regard to maintain our rank and dignity in society, is the
only motive which can ennoble the expression of this disagreeable passion.**
Vengeance–the instinctive desire to get back at the source of one’s injury–is
generally accompanied by the moral emotion of resentment and indignation, which are also
natural psychological reactions.1 These emotions rest on their own bottoms; that is to say,
they are not derivative of other emotions.2 We can and do give these emotions cognitive
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content,3 inasmuch as they have developed and matured over time with culture, but they
are primitive.4 They arise when an individual suffers a non-trivial injury that was inflicted
without excuse or justification.5 Among other injuries suffered, the harm done discounts
the value we hold of ourselves as human beings, so that when this discounting (the crime
or a substantial tort) occurs, our natural moral trip wires are pulled.6 We react defensively;
our worth as an individual feels threatened. We hope then to impose punishment, and do
it our own way at least as an initial sentiment. Over time, though, we have evolved; we elect
(or otherwise permit) agents to act for us as surrogates and thus we avoid some of the costs
entailed in the process of imposing punishment. Forgiveness comes later, if it ever comes.
Though it is owed to no one, it seems to reflect an effort to deal with these basic, adaptive
reactions. I believe that, at least sometimes, some among us can accept the compromised
conditions necessary to grant forgiveness with sufficient compassion and humility to justify
this generosity. Ironically, the ability to forgive could rest on principles of utility that
respect these retributive emotions; we might call it a kind of enlightened utilitarianism with
a dash of teleology.
I try to untangle these issues by dividing the topic into three parts, beginning with
a brief and very basic outline of punishment theory: What are the moral justifications for
punishment? These are questions whose answers are central to moral theory and the
concept of forgiveness. Thus an understanding of the broad theoretical outlines is
necessary to put vengeance and forgiveness in their proper perspective. The theory is also
3
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increasingly informed by our understanding of neurobiology. Next, I define vengeance,
resentment and forgiveness for purposes of this essay. Finally, I’ll try to tie the first two
parts together by asking what conditions, if any, might permit forgiveness or something like
forgiveness to occur without seriously compromising the forgiver’s sense of self-worth. The
essay ends with a description of and prescription favoring a sort of “Forgiveness-Lite.”
I
Forgiveness roams the outskirts of law, and especially criminal law. As they stand
awaiting sentencing, for example, most convicted defendants use their moments of
allocution to assure the court that they have made a terrible mistake, that they have learned
their lesson, and that they seek the court’s forgiveness. Their appeals often sound genuine.
And then they are sentenced, unremarkably to a period of incarceration that the judge has
previously determined to be appropriate. The point is not that all such pleas are necessarily
disingenuous; many (perhaps most) are, given the dictates of the setting and the statistics
on recidivism. It is possible, though, that some first time offenders really have learned their
lesson. Who knows? In fact, it does not matter. The broader point is that contemporary
retributive justice demands pay back, and it usually is a stern and unforgiving one.
Compassion and forgiveness, if they come, must await the parole board.7 And there is the
rub: Forgiveness, from a moral point of view, makes sense theoretically as a deontological
conception, but from a practical point of view, the deontological conception is unreachable
in the absence of some utility, as I will suggest.
Forgiveness is thus a troublesome topic for the criminal law, both practically and
theoretically. The public’s embrace of muscular retributivism–a form of vindictiveness that
variously couples retributivism to some moral foundations8–makes it virtually impossible
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as a practical matter for politicians to embrace the compassionate side of their
natures9–whether that side might reflect incarceration followed by genuinely welcoming
back into the community those who have paid their debt,10 or the recognition of the need
for incapacitation without punishment in light of prima facie neurobiological deficits. On
the theoretical side, it is unclear whether forgiveness is even necessary from a deontological
perspective.
But I am putting the cart before the horse. First I need to present a brief review of
the basics. The jurisprudential question we ask when we talk about theories of punishment
is, Why do we punish? What are the moral and rational justifications for this social
institution?11 What links pain inflicted with pain imposed? Writ large, these questions
traditionally find their answers within one of the two major theoretical moral foundations
of punishment: retribution and utility.
A. Retribution. Modernly we associate our understanding of retribution with
Kant and then Hegel and, more recently, with Peter Strawson and Herbert Morris.12
Retributive theorists elaborate different conceptions of the fierceness of retributive goal,13
but the transcendent principle of morality has a long pedigree that is associated with the
familiar notion of “desert:” The wrongdoer deserves the punishment society imposes on
him because he has injured someone without sufficient justification–he wasn’t doing
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something we approve of–or excuse–he wasn’t grossly defective in his cognition or volition.
The major underlying premise is Kantian: Every person, by virtue of his or her humanity
alone, is an autonomous and rational decision-maker capable of doing good because we all
possess a will that is capable of unsurpassed goodness. Those capacities–autonomy and
rationality–are the bottom-line measures of our moral worth. That being the case, one
logical inference is that when an actor commits a wrong, he’s presumed to have exercised
the unfettered choice to commit (or not to commit) that wrong, absent gross and verifiable
deficiencies. A second inference follows: If the wrongdoer then chooses to break the law,
he violates the victim’s equal worth, and thereby gains (or potentially gains) an undeserved
advantage or benefit for which he must be pay; that is how we honor his humanity.14 Three
conclusions then follow: First, punishment–the intentional, societal infliction of physical
harm upon, and/or the deliberate, intrusive confinement of the wrongdoer15–is at least
morally permissible (if not obligatory) under these circumstances; second, the harm society
imposes on the wrongdoer must be rationally and morally defensible as proportionate to
(as “fitting”) the wrong done; and third, traditionally, the purpose of punishment may not
be utilitarian: Punishment must be directed at the individual wrongdoer and no one else.16
This last point is of potential importance here because retributive theories of punishment
must have their origin in some non-consequentialist foundation rooted in a universally
applicable, à priori conception of justice: It is a categorical imperative. So tools like
rehabilitation, education, simple constraint, and deterrence (specific or general) are
impermissible goals.
Kant defined his own approach to punishment with the Latin phrase, jus talionis, the
“right of retaliation,” which he took quite seriously. Kant maintained famously that
imposing the death penalty was a categorical necessity following a conviction for homicide:
Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its
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members–as might be supposed in the case of a People inhabiting an island
resolving to separate and scatter themselves throughout the whole world–the
last Murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution
was carried out. . . . If they fail to do so, they may be regarded as accomplices
in this . . . violation.17
Kant provides several reasons for this harsh-sounding command but most important was
that the perpetrator’s death was a simple metric: Death was the only punishment
proportioned to the harm done, and to fail to impose the only proportional punishment
available would violate the categorical prohibition against using a person merely as a means
to an end. Failure to impose the death penalty would indicate a failure to respect the
autonomy of the wrongdoer, and that failure would make accomplices of those who neglect
to impose the appropriate punishment. In essence, we would be condoning the crime and
affirming the dis-value of the victim. And to treat someone who committed a crime as a
means to an end–that is, to impose punishment for the sake of deterring others or simply
constraining the wrongdoer or hoping to educate the wrongdoer, for example–violates the
wrongdoer’s “Inborn Personality,” which deserves respect “although he may be condemned
to lose his Civil Personality.”18 He will be hanged until dead.
What is important to note, and this will become clearer subsequently, is that the
moral foundation of retributivism is formal and detached.19 The unsurpassing nature of the
good will, of rationality and autonomy, presents a standard of moral conduct, the
categorical imperative, that is and can be only hortatory. For real people, intellectual and
volitional capacities are distributed along familiar, standard measures.20 Some very
thoughtful research in the neuropsychology and neurobiology of morality and cognition
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supports the notion that retribution as applied either serves goals that are also utilitarian,21
or is grounded in neurobiological correlates that vary depending upon the nature of the
moral problem.22
B. Utility. Where Kant and traditional retributivists generally recoil at the idea of
using a person solely as a means to a social end, Bentham and the utilitarians could
conceive of no reason other than aggregate social benefit as a goal of punishment. The
argument is uncomplicated:
The general object which all laws . . . ought to have . . . is to augment the total
happiness of the community; and, therefore, in the first place, to exclude, as
far as may be, every thing that tend to subtract from that happiness: in other
words, to exclude mischief.
But all punishment is mischief; all punishment is evil. Upon the
principle of utility, it ought to be admitted . . . only . . . in as far as it promises
to exclude greater evil.23
So we can summarize Bentham’s argument as follows:
(i) All laws should promote happiness, i.e., aggregate social gain;
(ii) Punishment itself doesn’t promote happiness;
(iii) Therefore, laws requiring punishment should be enforced
only when doing so otherwise promotes happiness, i.e., when they
produce a net social gain.
Despite his simplicity, Bentham did not oppose retribution in all its aspects. He rejected
its use as a general moral justification for punishment, but he understood that vengeance
was a powerful motivator that could produce useful consequences: “It is the vindictive
satisfaction which often unties the tongue of the witnesses; . . . which generally animates
the breast of the accuser; and engages him in the service of justice, notwithstanding the
[many] expenses.”24
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The basic theoretical distinction retributivists and utilitarians is this: For
retributivists, treating a person merely as a means to a social end is immoral; it denies the
autonomy and rationality of the wrongdoer, formally conceived. For utilitarian theorists,
not only is treating a person as a means morally permissible, it is generally the only morally
permissible goal of punishment, which is justified to end mischief if, but only if, the
mischief is sufficiently great that failing to punish it would threaten the common good. For
the retributivist, the state’s punishment machinery can be described as a kind of “sanitized
revenge,” that is, it serves as a substitute for the kind of “simple revenge” that might
otherwise occurs when “family members of the injured or the injured himself retaliates
against the wrong-doer.”25 From the viewpoint of utilitarian theory, punishment serves the
aggregate good when it acts to prevent future harm the possibility of which outweighs the
harm done by punishment itself.
II
We humans have recognized almost from our recorded beginnings that human life
is vulnerable to invasion and harm by the acts of others, and that the basic remedy for this
kind of invasion–vengeance–is an appropriate counter-invasion.26 The evidence strongly
suggests that this counter-invasion disposition–the “fight” half of the “fight or flight”
response–is an adaptive reaction.27 Ethologists have suggested that punishment makes
cooperative adaptation possible.28 Kant called this reaction to injury retaliation; Smith
spoke of resentment and punishment; others call it vengeance or revenge.
Revenge should be a personal right. After all, if retaliation is appropriate in any
# – , Pt. II, Bk. I, Ch. IX.
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context, it is owed to and ought to be carried out by the individual harmed. It is not always
confined to the individual, however; frequently, it is carried out by groups with an axe to
grind.29 Because groups tend to over-punish, we try to confine its imposition to the
governing authorities. But I want to bracket the political context and define it in narrower
terms:
Vengeance is the act of getting back at, or the desire to get back at, the
person who inflicts a non-trivial harm, where the harm may be physical
(with all the variations we can think of in that realm); it may be
proprietary; or it may be psychological, that is, some physical or verbal act.
In each case, the injury suffered diminishes its victim such that, in any
context, the victim wants to assert or reassert the denial of devaluation.30
Forgiveness, in contrast, is a harder concept to corral because if it is a virtue, which
is debatable (some argue that it is supererogatory31), it seems to be warrantable only in
fairly circumscribed contexts. In contrast to vengeance, which is often a collective process
(think about ethnic cleansing), forgiveness is necessarily interpersonal; it can exist only
between two people of relatively equal moral or legal footing.32 It makes little sense to talk
about forgiving a person who has not inflicted a harm directly on the potential forgiver.
One may be appalled and think very little of white South Africans who oppressed black
South Africans by apartheid or those who implemented and carried out Jim Crow laws in
the American South, and one might think it is a horrible invasion when someone steals
something from a family member or friend, but how can one forgive another in either of
those contexts when they have been stopped if one was never stung by it. So in contrast to
vengeance, forgiveness makes sense to me only if it is granted by the party who suffered the
injury. To use the biblical idiom, we can forgive those who trespass but only if they trespass
against us.
Forgiveness begins with an effort to overcome the harm that generates resentment.33
29
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I frame it that way because resentment seems like an emotion that naturally follows an
injury, especially and intentional one. Adam Smith spoke to the origins of resentment in
THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS in 1759. His idea still rings true.
What chiefly outrages us against the man who injures or insults us is the little
account which he seems to make of us, the unreasonable preference which he
gives to himself above us, and the absurd self-love, by which he seems to
imagine that other people may be sacrificed at any time to his convenience or
his humor.34
It may well be that the actor who causes this feeling of diminution was operating carelessly
rather than intentionally, that he in fact gave no thought to the potential his conduct
created for harming another. Nonetheless, our reactions are of such a nature that we tend
to attribute wrongdoing to the character of the individual who caused our injury.35
Before turning to the circumstances under which forgiveness may be appropriate,
there is a bit more underbrush to remove. First, it is important to note that forgiveness is
not a legal concept; mercy, in the form of clemency or pardon, affects the legal process, but
it is not necessarily an act of forgiveness. Often, pardon (in particular) seems to reflect a
miscarriage of justice for which the prosecution ought to seek forgiveness; at any rate,
clemency and pardon are political acts not legal ones. What makes forgiveness difficult is
the fact that if it is not deserved, it does not look like a virtue at all; and when it apparently
is deserved, it may not be necessary, at least in theory.
This last point is teased out by Aurel Konai, who begins by making an important
distinction between forgiveness and condonation.36 Condonation occurs when a person
clearly knows that someone else has done wrong–he has harmed someone else without
justification or excuse–and the condoner disapproves of the wrongdoer’s conduct, but she
nevertheless refrains from taking any action that signals disapproval, and she knows she’s
refraining. Condonation is close to what we might call an excuse in legal or moral
terminology because, in circumstances that justify an excuse, we disapprove of the conduct
but we do not blame the wrongdoer because he suffers from some gross and verifiable
cognitive or volitional deficit.37 Forgiveness, in contrast, does not and cannot nullify either
the wrongdoing or the blameworthiness of the act; forgiving does not and must not
acquiesce in the offense. To be warranted, forgiveness has to face the wrong squarely–meek
responses are not tolerated. In fact, if the person wronged does acquiesce in the offense
34
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35
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(condonation), that person commits an offensive act of spinelessness: He permits the
wrongdoer to walk all over him.38
III
When one unravels the Kantian premises on which secular conceptions of
forgiveness rest, from the moral point of view one finds an apparent paradox. That
conclusion begins with the Kantian notion that everyone is entitled to full respect as
rational and autonomous individuals: the basic premise of retribution. Since we punish
to honor the fact of each individual’s humanity,
we should forgive if, but only if, the wrongdoer genuinely acknowledges the
wrongfulness of his act (he expresses sincere regret) and he promises
solemnly and in a sustained way not to treat the victim as he had.
Forgiveness thus requires some performative act–repentance, an admission of wrongdoing, a plea for forgiveness and so on. If the wrongdoer goes through this kind of process,
we once again accept him as a person worthy of full moral (and legal) respect. And now the
paradox: If the wrongdoer has actually mended his ways, then the injured party is required
to accord the wrongdoer the full respect his humanity deserves, in which case the act of
forgiveness seems unnecessary and even redundant.
Can the utilitarian exercise forgiveness? Can there be an aggregate social gain
attributed to forgiving wrongdoers? Or, conversely, might we simply be encouraging
wrongdoing if wrongdoers know they can receive absolution without genuine contrition and
be united again in the moral community? If utilitarians can embrace forgiveness, they
cannot embrace it easily on the terms just described, but perhaps it can be justified on its
own terms if the wrongdoer views forgiveness as a positive or pro-virtue. If, however, utility
incorporates the individual in its moral calculations only as an instrumental contributor to
the common good–that is, as one of the many units that maximize aggregate
preferences–then it is difficult to envision how forgiveness, defined roughly as welcoming
the wrongdoer’s return to full moral status, works in a utilitarian system. The basic point
is that forgiveness is based on moral respect for the individual, which is problematic from
most rigorous utilitarian perspectives.
The orthodox view of forgiveness presented here rests on the idea that we can
overcome our natural desire for revenge and feelings of resentment, which reactions may
be hard-wired to some extent.39 But to what extent? One question that needs to be
answered is whether, in theory, our retributive emotions must always constrain public
38
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policy. Smith describes punishment as the “natural gratification” of resentment. What does
“natural” entail? One interpretation of Smith, the more restrained one, holds that at least
some among us have some choice as to whether or not we act on those natural impulses
and, if we do, how and to what extent we act them out. So “natural,” on this view, is not
synonymous with all-out revenge. A second and stronger view holds that the naturalist
bases of this emotion demand a muscular form of retribution, for example, mandatory
minimum incarceration up to and including capital punishment.40 For Hume, though, the
distinction between the naturalist origins of our moral sentiments and the need to act on
them is clearer: Although an individual’s moral sentiment of anger and resentment is
always directed at the past, punishment always lies in the future; it becomes necessary only
when the transgressor “renders himself by his crimes, obnoxious to the public.” When a
publicly condemned wrong occurs, then we may suspend the ordinary “rules of justices are
. . . for a moment, and it becomes equitable to inflict [punishment] on him, for the benefit
of society.”41 For Hume, then, there is always an additional, forward-looking question about
the need for punishment, which (of course) always has at the very least a minimal
retributive feature to it. Although there is some tension here between the idea that our
sentiments of resentment are part of our basic human constitution, and the question
whether or not those sentiments can be suspended in the practice of punishment, still both
seem to allow for some choice at least about the extent of one’s resentment (and at least for
some people some of the time).
A second question then is whether maintaining resentment, holding onto what Jean
Hampton called that “defiant” attitude–“You’ve outraged me by giving an indefensible
preference to yourself over my being and you had no right to do so, you rotten S&%, and I’ll
. . .”–is a necessary feature in the application of just punishment? Or should we try to
provide a different, more compassionate strategy, knowing as we do so (i) that some
sufficient fraction of the polity can overcome these natural emotions, (ii) that some of the
conditions for granting forgiveness will not be fully met, but recognizing (iii) that all
conditions must be met to some extent otherwise we sacrifice our moral sensibilities far
more than we should? When do forgetting and moving on enter our thoughts? Do
“forgetting” and “moving on” provide a morally weak combination, akin to condonation?
Or, is “moving on” to some extent a kind of bio-social or pro-social necessity? And, if so,
when is the overall public welfare served well by forgetting and moving on, even if all the
formal conditions for forgiveness can be met only partially? That is what often occurs, for
example, when parole is granted; the conditions of good behavior and a willingness to take
responsibility, which are steps toward earning juridical forgiveness, are usually necessary
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conditions for parole.42
Certainly there are some people for whom, and there may be some offenses for
which, forgiveness and reconciliation just are not a realistic possibility. From the vantage
of criminal law, for example, individuals who lack either basic impulse control or a
conscience or both do not seem to be candidates for forgiveness. That kind of outlier–the
predatory psycho- or sociopath–does not live within the moral realm and so is outside the
realm of forgiveness. And on the offense side, an actor who assassinates or attempts to
assassinate the president may repent and may even have earned a kind of forgiveness, but
he can forget about ever getting out of prison assuming he escapes execution. At the other
end of the spectrum are those who are basically decent people for whom the wrongdoing
is an isolated act, or an act that may recur but only in fairly isolated conditions. But what
of individuals are in an existing relationship when a resentful act occurs, but for whom the
relational benefits are sufficiently important that when the reactive emotions are triggered
(because trust and esteem have been broken), some reconciliation is desired. The problem
here is that the existence of the retributive emotions and the possibility of reconciliation are
clearly in psychological tension and may be–if we expand generously on Joshua Greene’s
data about the variable neural correlates for moral problem solving that reflect retributive
and utilitarian approaches to such dilemmas–they may be in neurobiological tension.43 All
of which suggests that the desired resumption of cooperative relations is going to be
difficult. So then the question is: At what point might trust and moral equality be
sufficiently re-established to forgive?
Here we can move away from criminal law and consider examples of how these
problems arise in a hypothetical commercial and personal relationship: Suppose that Ron
owns and runs Company A, which has a long term supply contract with Barb, who owns and
runs Company B. Ron needs the product Barb’s company supplies. Now let’s assume that
Barb reneges on a deal; she breaks a promise (her company breaches its contract with Ron’s
company) and the breach causes an injury to Company A. Ron has lost some measure of
trust Barb, and he’s angered and feels somewhat diminished by her apparent disregard. If
Barb expresses genuine regret, provides an intelligible but non-excusing explanation, and
pledges not to breach Ron’s trust in the future, Ron’s forgiveness and reconciliation could
have a favorable effect on their relationship. In this sense, forgiveness may serve a
consequential goal, namely, making Barb a more reliable partner in the future. Some
42
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Kantians might view this as a crass outcome–using Barb instrumentally–but it seems to me
that it serves the entirely permissible goal of influencing future behavior for the betterment
of everyone.44
But what if Barb’s explanation consists of telling Ron that she received a better offer
from another buyer, Company C? Full stop! No further explanation. She may still express
regret and she may even give her pledge not to breach her promises in the future, but
forgiveness seems questionable and reconciliation fairly dubious; she has admitted no
wrongdoing. Ron may still need to reconcile; perhaps no other supplier can meet his
company’s needs, for whatever reason. But is the “reconciliation” that occurs even genuine,
or simply a descent into a mutual, temporary modus vivendi? Is there any reason to
suppose that Barb will not repeat her behavior again whenever she finds a better price for
her product? I think the hard question is whether reconciliation under this scenario will
actually make things worse by, in effect, condoning Barb’s promise breaking.
Just how hard this process can be is well illustrated by the kind of mediation that is
attempted routinely among married couples. Now suppose Barb and Ron are spouses.
Ron, the dirty scoundrel, is still trying to maximize his reproductive success, only he’s doing
so with “other” women and despite the fact that he has what is at least an average marriage
of 10 or 12 or 15 years and, say, two kids. Now the relationship of trust is deeply personal
and it has been severely compromised: Barb may no longer be able even to imagine trusting
Ron again when he claims he is working late or going out for a beer with the guys. Can
reconciliation occur without genuine repentance? Or will they have to satisfy themselves
with either a divorce or a shaky modus operandi?45
Forgiveness and reconciliation are acts of charity and beneficence. No one can claim
an entitlement to forgiveness and to bestow them, the forgiver (for example, Barb as the
victim of her philandering husband) has to believe that she will achieve a good outcome.
That does not mean she should forgive Ron in order to improve him, because that would
devalue her act of kindness and could bring about the worst kind of outcome–namely,
forgiving someone who views forgiveness as a weakness amounting to condonation.
Whether it can be done at all is answerable only in each specific context and with a
substantial set of facts.
Perhaps, one might object, we should distinguish between the actor towards whom
we feel resentment for diminishing us, and the act, and then focus on the latter. After all,
that is precisely the stance recommended by many Christians when they address an issue
44
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like homosexuality: Love the sinner, hate the sin! So now, forgiveness does not presuppose
resentment or even a negative attitude toward the offender, but toward the offender’s
wrongful action.46
Although one hears this plea frequently, there are several problems with it. First, at
least in the context of homosexuality and perhaps other phenomena that deal with sexual
orientation, it tends to collapse the distinction between wrongdoing and illness; the
wrongdoer, on this view, is necessarily sick. So there is something troubling to me about
this approach. In criminal law, for example, we routinely require both a voluntary harmful
act (or a voluntary act that causes harm) and a culpable state of mind; except for strict
liability crimes, we never detach the actor’s mental state from the act. If it were permissible
to distinguish between the actor and the act, then we would have to ask frankly when, if
ever, moral condemnation of an actor is appropriate. And, of course, if condemning the
actor (as opposed to the act) is never appropriate, then punishment and moral philosophy
are just damaging and ridiculous endeavors. In fact, the whole approach is semantically
and logically suspect: It confuses an act with a status, which, as a matter of criminal law,
is constitutionally impermissible to punish.
Second, even if this sort of distinction were permissible, it might be psychologically
impossible for the victim to make it: After all, we resent the author of the harm for doing
something–something wrong. When resentment is an appropriate moral emotion, rarely
do we condemn the offender’s action and retain a bullish mental attitude toward him as a
person–excusing conditions excepted, usually it is only for our children and loved ones that
we balance such dichotomous feelings. We are resentful at the actor for his wrongful act,
for devaluing us. Moreover, we tend to over-attribute a bad character to the actor who
produced these injuries.47 As a result of these and other forces, we want to see him
defeated, in some way; defeating the perpetrator is the corrective that vindicates our own,
pre-injury appraisal of worth, a point Jean Hampton makes persuasively. I suspect that is
why a number of philosophers who have written about forgiveness argue that to grant it,
the offender has to be worthy of it; as a pre-condition, he has to undertake some visible
performative act–some combination of confession, repentance, penance or whatever–that
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reflects that fact that he deserves it. That visible performance distances the wrongdoer
from his offensive act, and in doing so, he actively separates himself from the offense; that
act allows both the victim and (one hopes) the offender to retain their negative attitudes
toward the act, but it may also permit the victim to see the offender in a new (and forgiving)
light.48
IV
Can some of the newer institutions of punishment and sentencing, such as victimoffender conferencing and even victim impact testimony, serve to reduce the moral hatred
and desire for vengeance that often follows criminal victimization? Retributivism, of which
forgiveness is a part, has little room for compassionate responses to wrongdoing in today’s
criminal justice system: It is as if our theoretical and practical reasoning capacities are at
war with one another. However much we may adopt retributivism as a theory with
transcendent moral and legal authority, each of us wants safe streets for ourselves, our
families, our communities and our nations. And for many, retribution fulfills this personal
preference.
That forgiveness may have a utility in helping us move along suggests that we give
more attention to it as an interface between retribution and utility as moral justifications
for punishment, and less time debating these issues as either-or propositions. There is
some fascinating research on the neural bases for engaging in moral decision-making, all
of which suggest that (i) our emotions play a major role in decision-making,(ii) that the type
of decision we make tends to trigger areas of the brain with well-studied propensities
toward personal as opposed to impersonal actions, and (iii) that how we make decisions
have as much to do with the very nature of our wiring as it does whether we pursue a
retributivist or utilitarian agenda.49
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